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The present paper examines the historical choice points the led twentieth-century
cognitive science to its current commitment to correspondence approaches to real-
ity  and  truth.  Such  a  “correspondence”-driven  approach  to  reality  and  truth
stands in contrast to coherence-driven approaches, which were prominent in the
1800s and early 1900s. Coherence approaches refused to begin the conversation
regarding reality with the assumption that the important thing about it was its in-
dependence of observers because the reality-observer  split  inherent in corres-
pondence-driven views often led to objective-subjective divides, which, within sci-
entific theorizing, tended to render the latter causally unnecessary and in need of
ontological justification. The present paper fleshes out the differences between co-
herence- and correspondence-driven approaches to reality and truth, proposes an
explanation of why cognitive science came to favor correspondence approaches,
describes problems that have arisen in cognitive science because of its commit-
ment to correspondence theorizing, and proposes an alternative framework (i.e.,
Wild Systems Theory—WST) that is inspired by a coherence approach to reality
and truth, yet is entirely consistent with science. 
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1 Introduction
Over the course of its history, cognitive science
has often assumed that the important question
regarding reality was its independence of an ob-
server. Within this framework, epistemology be-
comes paramount as scientists work to discover
the  lawful  connections  between  observer-inde-
pendent reality and observers. Implicit, if not ex-
plicit, in this approach to cognitive science is the
assumption  that  “truth”  is  to  be  measured  in
terms of the degree of discrepancy between ob-
server-independent reality and whatever impres-
sions, thoughts, representations, affordances, and
other  observer-dependent  phenomena  observers
use to overcome this assumed epistemic gap. 
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In contrast to such correspondence-driven
approaches  to  reality  and truth,  many coher-
ence-driving philosophers of the late 1800s and
early 1900s rejected correspondence as a start-
ing point for ontology because they believed the
subject-object  divide  it  engendered  ultimately
made  it  difficult  to  defend  the  reality  of  the
subjective  (Gardner 2007;  Hegel 1971;  Priest
1991;  Tseng 2003). Given their commitment to
the reality of phenomena such as consciousness,
value, and meaning, coherence theorists refused
to accept the ontological risks inherent in cor-
respondence approaches to reality. Instead, they
proposed an alterative approach that admits the
reality of consciousness, value, and meaning and
assesses truth in terms of the degree of coher-
ence (i.e.,  non-contradiction) (Oakeshott 1933;
Tseng 2003). 
In what follows,  we flesh  out  the  differ-
ences  between coherence-  and correspondence-
driven approaches to reality, propose an explan-
ation of why cognitive science came to favor the
correspondence  approach,  describe  problems
that have arisen in cognitive science because of
its  commitment  to  correspondence  theorizing,
and  propose  an  alternative  framework  (i.e.,
Wild Systems Theory—WST) which is inspired
by a coherence  approach to reality yet  is  en-
tirely consistent with science. 
2 Correspondence and coherence
2.1 A creation myth: The origins of the 
correspondence view
A  professor  walks  into  the  first  day  of  his
graduate-level Learning and Cognition course.
He tells the students the following story:
“A  boy  is  riding  his  bike  and  sees  a
bracelet on the street. He stops his bike, picks
up the bracelet, and realizes the bracelet is a
snake.” 
After  reading  the  story,  the  professor
asks  the  students  to  describe  it  using  the
concept  “real.”  The students share perplexed
glances, as if to say, “I signed up for a science
course,  not  a  philosophy  course.”  The  pro-
fessor continues to press the issue, and eventu-
ally a student speaks. 
“He thought  the  object  was  a  bracelet,
but it was really a snake.” 
This  prompts  another  student  to  say,
“He misperceived the snake as a bracelet.” 
The professor asks the class if  they un-
derstand  these  statements  and  if  they  agree
with the students’  use of  the concept “real.”
The vast majority of the class nods yes. 
The professor then asks the following, “Is
there anything real about the bracelet?”
Eyes roll and students laugh as the ques-
tion comes across as being silly more than im-
portant.  The  professor  waits  patiently  and
asks the question again. 
After  some time,  a  student  states,  “He
really believed he saw a bracelet.” 
When the professor asks the class if they
understand  and  agree  with  the  statement,
only half or less nods yes. 
To cut to the chase, the professor asks,
“How many of  you had a dream in the last
week?” 
Surprised by the question,  few students
raise their hand. 
Needing  to  get  the  class  on-board,  the
professor  pushes  harder  and asks,  “Ok.  How
many of  you have  had a  dream in  the  past
year?” 
Now everybody raises their hand. 
“Good,”  says  the  professor.  “And  was
there anything real about the dream?”
Connecting  the  questions  regarding  the
reality  of  the  bracelet  and  the  reality  of
dreams, a student says, “The dream was real
in the sense that I had the experience.”
“Excellent,”  states  the  professor.  “Now
you understand the type of thinking that lies
at the root of our thinking about reality and
truth.”
Students look back at him, slightly puzzled.
“According  to  what  you  just  told  me,”
the professor begins, “both the snake and the
bracelet are real.”
The class continues to stare.
“How  many  of  you  think  the  two  are
equally real?”
More staring.
“OK. How many of you think the snake
is more real than the bracelet?”
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Roughly  two-thirds  of  the  class  raises
their hand. 
“Why?”
One student raises her hand and states,
“The  boy  really  experienced  a  bracelet,  but
since the bracelet was an incorrect perception,
the snake is more real.”
“And when the boy finally had a snake
perception,” states the professor, “his percep-
tion was correct?”
“Yes,” responds the student confidently.
“Excellent!” exclaims the professor. “How
many agree?”
The students look back and forth to each
other,  seeking  an  answer.  Eventually,  most
everyone in the class raises their hand. 
“Now  we  are  truly  making  progress,”
states  the professor,  “and for my final  ques-
tion, how do we know the snake is more real
than the bracelet?”
The same student answers without hesit-
ation,  “Because  the  snake  perception  accur-
ately corresponds to the object.” 
“There  it  is,”  exclaims  the  professor.
“We know the object is really a snake because
our  experiences  correspond  to  it.  In  short,
perceptions are true, or accurate, because they
correspond to reality correctly.” 
He centers  himself  in  front  of  the class
and states, “This way of describing reality is
known  as  the  correspondence  approach  to
truth  and reality.  It  has  dominated  the way
we think about truth and reality for at least
four  hundred  years,  if  not  longer.  And  over
the next two weeks I hope to show you that if
you believe this approach to truth and reality,
you, one, logically deny yourself access to real-
ity, and, two, make it very difficult to defend
the reality of  phenomena such as love,  hate,
the  sound  of  music,  and  the  taste  of  ice
cream.”
He looks out over the class and sees that
he has their attention.
“How  many  of  your  really  like  ice
cream?” he asks.
Everyone  raises  their  hand  instantly.
Some students raise both hands.
“Good then,”  the  professor  states.  “Let
us begin.”
2.2 A very brief history of 
correspondence, reality, and truth
While the story described above may seem rudi-
mentary, the purpose is to give the reader, as
well  as  the  hypothetical  student,  a  common
entry point into the conversation regarding cor-
respondence and coherence approaches to real-
ity and truth. This is important because coher-
ence  approaches  have  not  been  proposed  all
that  often  over  the  past  one  hundred  years.
Thus, very few contemporary cognitive scient-
ists know of them, let alone make use of them.
This century-long waxing and waning of corres-
pondence  and  coherence  approaches,  respect-
ively, may have had something to do with the
fact  that  alternatives  to  correspondence  have
come to be seen as increasingly irrelevant after
a century of naturalism, physicalism, and real-
ism. That is, the increasingly sophisticated view
of the physical world that has developed over
centuries of scientific practice has led the vast
majority of practicing cognitive scientists to as-
sume that  the  issue  of  reality  and  truth  has
been solved, and by using science, we decrease
the degree of discrepancy between objective and
subjective reality. From this perspective, science
is metaphysical in the sense that science reveals
how reality  really  is,  independent of  our  per-
sonal perspective. 
While  this  correspondence-driven,  meta-
physical take on science is practically implicit in
contemporary cognitive science, we propose that
the issues addressed in the snake/bracelet story
are, in fact, unresolved. Furthermore, we believe
that  the  current  zeitgeist  of  correspondence
thinking is  due to historical  choices  regarding
our conceptualization of  the  reality of  human
experience.  In what follows,  we briefly review
some of these choice points in the hope of clari-
fying why a commitment to correspondence has
seemed to be such an obvious step for cognitive
scientists.
a. Spiritual versus mental subjectiv-
ity. Questions about whether or not the brace-
let is real, or the manner in which it is real in
relation to the reality of the snake, are the same
kind of questions René Descartes asked himself
when he addressed the reality of God and the
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material  world  hundreds  of  years  ago.  To  be
sure, very few if any contemporary cognitive sci-
entists  would  account  for  the  reality  of  the
snake and the bracelet via Descartes’s notion of
interacting  yet  qualitatively  distinct  physical
and spiritual realities (i.e.,  dualism). However,
despite their assumed distinctiveness from dual-
ism, most contemporary cognitive scientists im-
plicitly,  if  not explicitly,  endorse the basic as-
sumption of dualism that the interesting point
about reality is the extent to which it is inde-
pendent of observers. This commitment to cor-
respondence thinking was evident in the writing
of one of Descartes’ major critics,  John Locke
(1700). Even after Locke took some of the first
formal steps toward developing cognitive science
(i.e., a “science of man”) and re-described the
spiritual  side  of  Descartes’  dualism  as  being
“mental,”  the question for Locke’s  “science of
man” was how it is that our sense impressions
are  able  to  accurately  correspond  to  physical
reality.
b.  Radical  skepticism. In  response  to
Locke’s  non-spiritual  correspondence  approach
to reality and truth, David Hume (2012) asked
whether or not such an approach is even logic-
ally  possible.  Specifically,  Hume’s  basic  argu-
ment  was  that  if  one  accounts  for  reality  in
terms of the “impressions and ideas” it causes
within us, then all we can ever really know are
the impressions and ideas we have about reality.
This is because every test we could ever run to
assess the extent to which our impressions and
ideas about external reality are accurate would
have  to  be  mediated  by  impressions  and
thoughts. That is, once we claim that we know
external  reality  through  observer-dependent
structures such as thoughts and impressions, we
have logically doomed all of our knowledge to
be trapped within us. 
Though Hume’s radical skepticism is hun-
dreds of years old, and seems outdated to many
contemporary scientists in general—and cognit-
ive  scientists,  specifically—we  believe  Hume’s
radical skepticism constitutes both a historical
choice point and an individual choice point for
the issue of how we conceptualize the reality of
the subjective. On the one hand, there were and
are those scholars who took radical skepticism
to be diagnostic of a logically flawed approach
to reality and truth. On the other, there were
and are those who believed and continue to be-
lieve that the test for whether or not the corres-
pondence approach to reality and truth is “cor-
rect” is empirical. That is, the “correctness” of
science  will  ultimately  be  decided  on  corres-
pondence grounds; that is, by whether or not
science can eventually represent the entirety of
observer-independent reality accurately. In what
follows, we examine various historical attempts
to sustain the correspondence approach in spite
of radical skepticism.
c.  Overcoming  radical  skepticism.
What is somewhat ironic about the attempt to
overcome skepticism is that although those who
did and do so tend to present themselves as be-
ing quite different from each other, they non-
etheless  avoid  skepticism in roughly  the  same
way; specifically, by nesting the correspondence
relation within an assumed, larger-scale reality
that  guarantees  the  veridicality  of  the corres-
pondence relation. Descartes, for example, after
having  doubted  all  but  his  ability  to  doubt,
then went on to infer that his ability to do so
could have only been created by a superior, om-
nipotent being (i.e., God). Then, to secure the
correspondence  relationship  completely,  he  as-
sumed that his subjectivity must correspond ac-
curately  to  reality  because  God  created  both
and would not have done so incorrectly. Bishop
Berkeley made much the same maneuver when
he proposed to overcome Hume’s radical skepti-
cism by asserting that the correspondence rela-
tion holds because we exist within God’s mind.
Cognitive  scientists,  while  certainly  not
dualists, nonetheless rely on evolutionary theory
as a means of placing the correspondence rela-
tionship within a larger-scale reality as a means
of  validating  the  correspondence  relationship.
There are two dominant varieties of such think-
ing: indirect-realism and direct-realism. Realism
is the assertion that objects exist as they are,
with all of their intrinsic properties, independ-
ently of observers. Indirect realism asserts that
our  knowledge  of  reality  is  mediated  by  our
sensory systems and knowledge structures. Dir-
ect  realism  asserts  that  our  knowledge  struc-
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tures are directly in contact with external prop-
erties, exactly as they are. 
Indirect realism is basically an evolution-
arily inspired re-description of Locke’s mediated
theory of  perception  in  which external  events
cause the internal formation of impressions and
ideas. Though there are many varieties of indir-
ect realism (Fodor 1983; Pinker 1999), common
to most is the computationalist, representation-
alist view of cognition, which assumes that we
know what is outside of us because of the rep-
resentations  that  external  events  cause  within
our  brains.  Given  that  our  brains  co-evolved
with the world and were naturally selected, it
seems self-evident that our brains give us accur-
ate access to external reality.
While  in the early days of  cognitive sci-
ence  indirect  realists  believed  that  internal,
sensory-driven  (i.e.,  bottom-up)  representation
of external events could be augmented by top-
down,  cognitive  processes  such  as  attention
(Broadbent 1958;  Cherry 1953), they still non-
etheless believed that the bottom-up processes
entailed  accurate  representations  of  their  ex-
ternal causes. Such assumptions derived support
from findings such as  Hubel &  Wiesel’s (1962)
discovery of neurons in the primary visual cor-
tex (V1), that expressed spatially correspondent
receptive fields (i.e., the activity of a neuron in
V1 could be maximally stimulated by a visual
stimulus emanating from a particular  location
in  the  visual  field).  Later  research revealed  a
massive  degree  of  spatial  correspondence
between locations in external space and neural
space within a host of different modalities (e.g.,
visual, auditory, and kinesthetic space).  Milner
& Goodale’s (1995) discovery of visual systems
used for object identification versus visual sys-
tems used for guiding action (i.e., vision for per-
ception versus vision for action) further solidi-
fied indirect realism because it seemed to clarify
how internal representations of external events
were  used  to  accurately  guide  behaviors  back
onto external reality.
In light of this accumulating neural evid-
ence as well as a host of perceptual-cognitive re-
search that revealed our apparent ability to rep-
resent invariant properties of biologically relev-
ant  external  events,  Roger Shepard (2001)
stated the following in the opening line of the
abstract  to  his  seminal  paper,  Perceptual-cog-
nitive  Universals  as  Reflections  of  the  World:
“The  universality,  invariance,  and  elegance  of
principles governing the universe may be reflec-
ted in principles of the minds that evolved in
that universe” (p. 581). Clearly, from this indir-
ect-realist  perspective,  our  connection  to  the
world around us is mediated by internal repres-
entations  that  are  phylogenetically  derived
stand-ins for what the world around us is like. 
Critiques of indirect realism within cognit-
ive science basically recapitulated Hume’s  cri-
tique of Locke’s mediated theory of perception.
That is, cognitive scientists dating back as far
as the Six Realists (Holt et al. 1910) criticized
the representational approach to cognition be-
cause they believed it logically denied one ac-
cess to external reality. Interestingly enough, in-
stead of challenging the correspondence view of
reality and truth that lay at the heart of indir-
ect  realism,  and  which  constituted  Hume’s
biggest concern with Locke’s approach, cognit-
ive scientists who labeled themselves direct-real-
ists argued that the connections between the in-
ternal and the external were not constituted of
mediating representations of  the external  but,
rather, of natural relations between the organ-
ism  and  the  environment.  Though  this  idea
dates back at least as far as William James as
well  as  the  Gestalt  psychologist  Kurt  Koffka
(Ash 1998), perhaps its most influential expres-
sion was provided by J. J. Gibson (1979), who
argued that we perceive the world in terms of
behavioral possibilities, what he referred to as
affordances.
Since  Gibson (1979),  many cognitive sci-
entists have effectively investigated affordances.
Given  that  most  ecological  psychologists  who
investigate affordances are simultaneously direct
realists, it is important to their realism that af-
fordances be real, and that we have direct ac-
cess to affordances via our sensory systems. In-
stead of constructing representations, however,
our sensory systems are described as having the
task of picking up or detecting information (i.e.,
affordances). 
The direct-realist appeal to the reality of
directly  perceivable  affordances  defends  the
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validity  of  the  correspondence  relation  by ar-
guing that organisms veridically perceive afford-
ances because they evolved to do so. That is,
just as was the case with Descartes, Berkeley,
and indirect realism, the assertion of the corres-
pondence  relation  is  validated  by  placing  it
within an  assumed,  larger-scale  reality.  In the
case of direct realism, that assumed, larger-scale
reality is the evolved physical world. 
By calling the  evolved,  physical  world an
assumed, larger-scale reality, we are not propos-
ing  that  the  theory of  evolution is  untrue,  or
that the phenomena referred to via the concept
of the physical world do not exist. In fact, we be-
lieve the phenomena referred to via the concept
of the physical world do exist, and we further be-
lieve that the theory of evolution is “true.” We
just believe they exist and are true respectively,
in a manner that is not couched in the corres-
pondence framework espoused by realists.  (We
will describe how we believe they exist and are
true at a later point in this paper.) Rather, what
we are trying to accomplish by referring to the
evolved  physical  world  as  an  assumed,  larger-
scale reality is to point out the common strategy
shared  by  correspondence  theorists  across  the
centuries. Specifically, if one espouses a corres-
pondence account of reality, in which knowledge
and/or perceptual structures are meant to cor-
respond to reality, either via perceptually gener-
ated representations or via evolutionarily tailored
relations, then, by definition, all we have contact
with  are  knowledge  and perceptual  structures,
and any statement about external reality is an
assumption. This, in fact, was the gist of Hume’s
critique of  Locke’s  mediated theory of  percep-
tion. Radical skepticism does not argue that ob-
jects do not exist. Rather, it is simply a critique
of a particular account of reality (i.e., the corres-
pondence account), and the critique refers to the
logical coherence of the account. If one espouses
a  correspondence  framework  for  reality  and
truth, one has logically denied oneself access to
external reality, and neither empirical data nor
an assumed larger-scale reality is capable of over-
coming  this  logical  flaw.  On  logical  grounds
alone, one cannot use realism and its attendant
correspondence  arguments  to  overcome  radical
skepticism. 
To be sure, direct realists might respond
that  their  brand of  realism overcomes  radical
skepticism because direct realism does not rely
on internal  representations  to  connect  the in-
ternal to the external. Rather, the connections,
as stated above, are conceptualized in terms of
relations between organisms and environments
that co-evolved in such a way that organisms
are able to directly perceive these relations (i.e.,
affordances). 
While at first glance the anti-representa-
tional  slant  of  these  arguments  does  seem to
skirt the issue of radical skepticism, it’s appeal
to relations or relational properties between re-
lata  (e.g.,  organisms  and  environments)  still
commits  to  the  correspondence  notion  that
truth  is  determined  by  the  degree  of  corres-
pondence between the system (i.e.,  the organ-
ism) and something external to the system (i.e.,
affordances).  Again,  this  commitment  to  the
correspondence relation stems from the centur-
ies-old  belief  that  the  important  thing  about
reality is its independence of observers. Armed
with such an approach to reality and truth, sci-
ence is believed to be metaphysical in that it re-
veals  observer-independent  properties  of  ex-
ternal reality. To be sure, the direct realist will
argue that evolution has solved all of this. How-
ever,  as was stated above, it is  their  commit-
ment to realism that logically denies the corres-
pondence scholar access to external reality.  In
short,  it  is  the  logically  incoherent  notion  of
correspondence that denies the realist access to
external reality, not reality itself. 
2.3 The coherence approach to reality 
and truth
In order to overcome the representationalism in-
herent  in  indirect  realism,  direct  realists  re-
framed the connection between organisms and
environments in terms of evolutionarily derived
relations as opposed to internal representations.
Doing so, however, begs the issue of the nature
of  the  things  that  stand  in  relation  to  each
other  (i.e.,  the  relata).  Are  the  relata  them-
selves constituted of relational properties? If so,
just how far down is reality constituted of rela-
tions? 
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While  questions  regarding  the  relational
nature of reality might seem silly to contempor-
ary cognitive scientists, it was actually of para-
mount importance to the maintenance and per-
petuation  of  the  correspondence  approach
roughly a century ago. Bertrand Russell (1911),
for example, went to great lengths to counter
the notion of internal relations that was prom-
inent  in  idealist  philosophy  in  the  1800s  and
early 1900s. As described by Russell, the notion
of internal relations is  the idea that the rela-
tions between entity A and B are actually con-
stituents of A and B. In other words, part of
what constitutes A is its relationship with B.
This idea was problematic for Russell because
idealist philosophers often used it as a means of
overcoming  radical  skepticism.  Specifically,
these philosophers proposed that the objectivity
of  supposed  external  reality  was  actually  ob-
server dependent, in that a subject (i.e., an ob-
server)  was  internally  related  to  its  objects.
That is, the objects do not have an existence in-
dependent of the subject, and vice versa (Hegel
1971;  Oakeshott 1933;  Priest 1991).  Different
idealist  philosophers held different motivations
for espousing this view. Many did so in order to
maintain the reality of God. Others did so in
order to maintain the reality of phenomena that
Descartes had relegated to the subjective (e.g.,
values, meaning, and aesthetics). 
Regardless of their motivations, the ideal-
ist notion of internal relations was problematic
for Russell because he wanted to describe real-
ity in terms of the objects of science and logic.
In short, Russell wanted metaphysics to be em-
pirical. In order to do so, he felt he needed to
establish  the  logical  independence  of  external
reality. That is, he had to show that objects are
not internally related to subjects. As a result,
he  argued  that  not  all  relations  are  internal,
and that some are external.  By external rela-
tions, Russell meant that a relationship between
entity A and entity B is not constitutive of en-
tities A and B. An example of an external rela-
tion would be the relative height of two people,
say Mary and Sam. While it is logically coher-
ent to state that Mary is taller than Sam, the
“taller”  relation  is  not  constitutive  of  either
Mary or Sam. That is, the “taller” relation de-
pends, of course, upon Mary and Sam, but it
exists  externally  from Mary  and  Sam in  the
sense that it plays no role in the properties that
constitute Mary or Sam. Russell uses this no-
tion of external relations to propose a corres-
pondence  approach  to  reality  and  truth  in
which entities share relations and via those rela-
tions constitute components of complexes. Hav-
ing assumed that he had logically negated the
notion  of  internal  relations,  Russell  then  pro-
posed that we get on with the empirical, meta-
physical business of scientifically describing real-
ity “as it is,” independent of observers. 
The use of the notion of externally related
entities  as  a  means  of  sustaining  the  corres-
pondence approach to reality and truth is also
evident  in  the  work of  direct  realists  such as
Holt et al. (1910) and Gibson (1979). By utiliz-
ing this relation-driven form of realism, all three
were implicitly asserting the belief that the is-
sue of reality was to be solved via epistemology.
That is, they were continuing the centuries-old
argument that the important thing about real-
ity is its independence from observers. 
a. The relational nature of reality. As
stated above, the direct-realist assumption that
we have contact with external reality via rela-
tions begs the issue of the nature of the things
that stand in relation to each other (i.e., the re-
lata). In other words, if we claim that two re-
lata share a relation, we imply that there is a
difference  between  relata  and  relations.  This
leads to another choice point that historically
influenced the manner in which we describe the
reality of the subjective: Are the relata them-
selves constituted of relational properties, or are
they  constituted  of  non-relational  properties,
what one might refer to as intrinsic properties?
The answer to this question is important, for if
one argues for a difference between intrinsic and
relational properties, then realism seems the ob-
vious choice;  the purpose of  science is  to  un-
cover the intrinsic properties of reality. If, how-
ever,  one  assumes  that  relata  are  themselves
constituted of relational properties, we have a
much different problem. For if all relata are con-
stituted of relations, then there can be no in-
trinsic properties. This is because the constitu-
tion of all properties, by definition, would be re-
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lational.  In  short,  reality  would  constitute  a
unity in which all things were constituted of all
things. 
The notion that  all  things are about all
things sounds much like the idealist notion of
internal  relations.  And  while  the  idea  might
seem outdated  in  contemporary  cognitive  sci-
ence,  it  has  recently  gained  traction  in  the
philosophy of science as a possible explanation
of properties. For example, mass is often con-
sidered an intrinsic property in that the mass of
an object is considered to be independent of its
context, while weight is considered to be an ex-
trinsic property because the object’s weight is
determined by how its mass interacts with its
context. Jammer (2000), however, proposes that
all particles receive their inertial mass via their
interactions with the Higgs field, “a scalar field
that  ‘permeates  all  of  space’  and  ‘endows
particles with mass’” (p. 162). Bauer (2011) ar-
gues that the dependence of mass on the Higgs
field  renders  mass  externally  grounded.  This
means that the mass of the particle is not inde-
pendent of its context. As a result, the object’s
mass is a relational, non-intrinsic property. 
Bauer’s  notion  of  external  grounding
should not be confused with Russell’s (1911) no-
tion of external relations. Bauer uses the notion
of external grounding to make the case that a
property (i.e., mass) that was assumed to be in-
trinsic (in order to distinguish it from the prop-
erty of weight, which was assumed to be contex-
tually relative) was actually contextually relat-
ive. “External” in this sense was used to flesh
out the relative nature of a previously assumed
to be non-relative (i.e., intrinsic) property (i.e.,
mass).  Russell,  on  the  other  hand,  used  the
concept “external” in the opposite way. That is,
he wanted to demonstrate that certain proper-
ties were independent (i.e., were not entailed in
the constitution) of other properties. In short,
Russell used the notion “external” to create in-
dependent properties  in  a reality the idealists
had  described  as  an  internally  related  unity,
while Bauer, roughly a century later, uses the
concept  “external”  to  re-contextualize  proper-
ties that post-Russellian realists had conceptu-
ally isolated from reality by describing them as
intrinsic. 
While one could see  Russell’s (1911) and
Bauer’s (2011) uses of the concept “external” as
contradictory and leave it  at  that,  one  might
also argue that their different uses of the same
concept are diagnostic of the success of Russell’s
efforts. Specifically, Russell used the concept ex-
ternal to de-contextualize certain parts of real-
ity (i.e., make them intrinsic), while Bauer, one
hundred years later, uses the same concept to
re-contextualize  what  Russell  had  worked  so
hard to de-contextualize. In short, one might ar-
gue that while Russell represented a first con-
ceptual  step  away from holism,  contemporary
works such as Bauer’s represent initial concep-
tual steps back toward holism. Further evidence
of a tendency to conceptually move the philo-
sophy of  science  away from the  notion  of  in-
trinsic properties can be found in the work of
Harré (1986), who proposes the notion of ultra-
grounding,  the  idea  that  a  property  may  be
grounded by a property, or properties, of reality
as a whole. 
Such an anti-intrinsic take on the nature
of properties is also proposed by both  Schaffer
(2003) and  Dehmelt (1989). These authors as-
sert that there may be no fundamental level to
reality at all  (i.e.,  no final,  non-relational,  in-
trinsic  property  that  forms  “relations”  into
“complexes”). Rather, they propose that reality
may be constituted of infinite levels of micro-
structure.  Consistent  with  the  notion  of  ex-
ternal grounding, Prior et al. (1982) propose the
Global Groundedness Thesis. This thesis asserts
that all dispositions (i.e., properties) are groun-
ded (i.e., externally grounded) rather than un-
grounded  (i.e.,  intrinsically  grounded).  Lady-
man et al. (2007) implicitly, if not explicitly, ex-
press a similar critique of the notion of intrinsic
properties when they assert that contemporary
analytic metaphysics needs to abandon the idea
that reality is constituted of self-subsistent indi-
vidual objects.
b. Truth in a relational reality. The
idea that reality is  infinitely relational is  in-
consistent  with  the  correspondence  approach
to reality and truth because a relational real-
ity  can  never  be  subdivided  into  final,  in-
trinsic, “in-and-of-themselves”-type properties.
In  an  infinitely  relational  reality,  all  objects
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and subjects  are  composed of  relations  (i.e.,
they  are  contextually  grounded),  and  all  in-
trinsic  properties  are  inherently  relational.
This  implies  that  dialectic  counterparts  such
as  objective  versus  subjective,  or  relational
versus  intrinsic,  come  to  be  introduced  into
one’s description of reality,  not because they
reflect accurate, final, ontological subdivisions
of  reality,  but  for  the  same  reason  one  de-
scribes  the snake  in  the snake-bracelet  story
as being more real than the bracelet—specific-
ally,  because  one  accepts  the  subjective-ob-
jective divide inherent in  the correspondence
view and tries to defend the assumed greater
reality of the snake by asserting its independ-
ence of oneself. It is this assumption that the
important  thing about reality is  its assumed
observer-independent  nature  that  drives  the
correspondence approach and leads one to fur-
ther believe that the goal of science is to over-
come  subjectivity  and  reveal  the  objective
truth about reality. Once such independence is
no longer assumed, then truth can no longer
be measured by assessing the degree of differ-
ence between reality and an impression, idea,
or representation we have of it, or by investig-
ating  an  assumed  relation  we share  with  it.
There exists nothing “as it is” to which any-
thing else can accurately correspond. The fi-
nal, ontological description of what something
is  must include reality as a whole.  In short,
truth must  be  assessed in  a non-correspond-
ence fashion.
One way to measure truth without assert-
ing a correspondence relationship is to do so on
the basis of coherence. By coherence we mean
lack  of  contradiction.  In  contemporary  philo-
sophy, lack of contradiction (i.e., coherence) is
most often used to refer to the means by which
a belief is justified (Kvanvig 1995; Lycan 2012).
Specifically, a subset of contemporary epistemo-
logists, who might be loosely referred to as “co-
herentists” (Lycan 2012;  Quine &  Ullian 1978;
Thagard 1978), propose a view akin to the fol-
lowing:
[…]what justifies […] the formation of any
new belief—is that the doxastic move in
question improves the subject’s explanat-
ory  position  overall  and/or increases  the
explanatory  coherence  of  the  subject’s
global set of beliefs. (Lycan 2012, p. 6)
While the coherentist approach to propositions
clearly relies on the notion of “lack of contradic-
tion” to measure the justifiability of beliefs, it
does not make use of “lack of contradiction” as
a measure of the truth inherent in experience.
As a result, it is logically possible for one to be
a coherentist about beliefs while simultaneously
holding  an  implicit  or  explicit  correspondence
view  that  conceptualizes  beliefs  as  subjective
propositions  that  refer  to  external,  objective
reality.  It  is  not  clear  where  Lycan (2012)
stands on this issue. 
At any given  moment,  we find ourselves
involuntarily  holding  any  number  of  be-
liefs, at least those produced by perception
and  by  memory;  however,  […]  I  do  not
make  any  primary  appeal  to  those  fac-
ulties as justifying. Call such unconsidered
beliefs  “spontaneous  beliefs”;  they  are
primarily  about  our  immediate  environ-
ment,  past  events,  sometimes  our  own
mental states, and more. (p. 6) 
Although Lycan (2012) makes no claims regard-
ing  the  metaphysical  status  of  perception,  or
where he stands on the issue of reality and ex-
perience, his use of the word  perception  allows
him to interject other phrases such as “primar-
ily  about  our  immediate  environment,”  that
then implicitly connect beliefs to external real-
ity via a correspondence relation. Regardless of
whether  or  not  this  was  Lycan’s  intent,  it  is
clear that coherentism is about the justifiability
of beliefs and not about reality, per se. As a res-
ult, it may not have much to offer in our at-
tempt to develop a coherence approach to real-
ity and experience.
One possible way to apply the coherence
approach to the issue of reality and experience
is  the  very  same  test  entailed  in  the  snake-
bracelet  problem.  If  one  assumes  that  reality
constitutes an internally related unity that de-
fies that logic of correspondence tests of truth,
then  statements  regarding  the  truth  of  the
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snake  and  the  bracelet  should  be  stated  in
terms of contradiction. That is, the statement
“the boy saw a bracelet while riding his bike” is
true in the sense that the boy had a persistent
flow of “bracelet” experience. The notion of per-
sistent flow is important here because it  calls
attention to the fact that from moment to mo-
ment during the bracelet phenomenon, the phe-
nomenon did not contradict itself; that is, the
“bracelet” phenomenon at one moment was not
followed  by  a  different  “non-bracelet”  phe-
nomenon the next. Jordan & Vandervert (1999)
propose that it is this coherent flow of phenom-
ena, what they refer to as “within-instance” co-
herence, that underlies our propositions regard-
ing the reality of phenomena. To be sure, later
on in the story,  when the boy picked up the
“bracelet,” he suddenly did have a contradiction
in the flow of the bracelet phenomenon; specific-
ally, the bracelet phenomenon was contradicted
by a “snake” phenomenon. Given that the snake
phenomenon persisted in a more coherent fash-
ion than the bracelet phenomenon (i.e., no mat-
ter what he did, the boy could not convert the
snake  phenomenon  into  another  type  of  phe-
nomenon), one then asserts that the snake phe-
nomenon is  more  real  than  the  bracelet  phe-
nomenon. From the coherence perspective, what
this means is that the snake phenomenon was
more coherent (i.e., more persistent, or less con-
tradictory) than the bracelet phenomenon. 
Such a coherence approach to the reality
and truth of phenomena is rather similar to the
approach  advocated  by  Michael  Oakeshott.  In
perhaps his most famous book,  Experience and
its Modes, Oakeshott (1933) described reality in
a manner that is consistent with the idea that
reality constitutes an internally related unity. He
did not say it this way, however. Rather, as was
consistent with both his idealist background and
the  philosophical  context  of  his  time,  he  de-
scribed reality in terms of experience and stated,
“[…]experience  is  a  single  whole,  within  which
modification  may  be  distinguished,  but  which
admits  of  no  final  or  absolute  division”
(Oakeshott 1933, p. 27). Also, 
[s]ubject  and object  are not  independent
elements  or  portions  of  experience;  they
are aspects of experience which, when sep-
arated from one another, degenerate into
abstractions.  Every experience [...]  is  the
unity of these, a unity which may be ana-
lysed into these two sides but which can
never  be  reduced  to  a  mere  relation
between them. (Oakeshott 1933, p. 60)
To be sure, the manner in which Oakeshott uses
the concept of experience makes it difficult for
those who have already made correspondence-
driven commitments to the meaning of “experi-
ence” to follow his arguments. For correspond-
ence theorists,  “experience” refers  to  the sub-
jective side of Descartes dualism. But given that
Oakeshott did not define experience in terms of
the  mental,  spiritual,  transcendental,  or  abso-
lute, it seems reasonable to assume that when
he described reality as a world of experience, he
was using the concept differently than it  had
been used by Locke, Kant, or Hegel. This is im-
portant, for when most contemporary cognitive
scientists refer to idealism, they tend to mention
Locke and Berkeley (Charles 2011). Locke and
Berkeley both accepted the correspondence rela-
tion.  Locke  accepted  it  without  reservation.
Berkeley accepted it and then placed it within
the assumed larger-scale reality of God’s mind
in order to avoid skepticism. Oakeshott, on the
other hand, denied the correspondence relation
(as did most all the German idealist philosoph-
ers).  Thus,  for  Oakeshott,  the terms “reality”
and “experience” were synonymous, not because
he  believed  reality  was  ultimately  subjective,
but because he believed reality constituted an
internally related unity that defied any ontolo-
gical, final division into dialectic categories such
as subjective and objective, or reality versus ex-
perience. 
c.  Coherence,  truth,  and  modes.
Oakeshott proposed his coherence approach to
reality and truth because he believed that the
correspondence approach was, first, logically in-
coherent,  and  second,  improperly  applied  in
contexts in which it was not relevant. Specific-
ally, Oakeshott argued that within the confines
of the correspondence approach, it was easy to
believe that the task of science was to uncover
the intrinsic, observer-independent properties of
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reality. In addition, given its supposed ability to
accumulate a stockpile of context-independent,
universal knowledge, it became easy to believe
that its criterion for truth (i.e., correspondence)
should have dominion over all arenas in which
truth was at stake.
Agreeing  with  his  idealist  predecessors
about the logical incoherence of correspondence
thinking, Oakeshott argued that endeavors such
as  “science”  constituted  modes  of  experience.
What he meant by “mode” is that science con-
stitutes a distinct means of generating abstrac-
tions about the internally related unity in which
we are embedded.  It  is  an abstraction in the
sense that it is constitutive of reality (i.e., it is
“within” the reality it is attempting to describe)
and can therefore never be “outside” of reality,
looking “at” reality.  As a result,  it  should be
conceptualized as a recursion on reality—an ab-
straction about that from which it emerged and
within which it is entailed. 
Oakeshott described at least four differ-
ent modes: science, daily practice (i.e.,  polit-
ics),  history,  and  poetry.  What  distinguishes
these modes, in addition to the content they
are about, is the means by which truth is de-
termined within each. In the mode of science,
truth is determined by the degree of quantit-
ative  coherence  that  can  be  achieved  in  the
description of  a  phenomenon,  both  individu-
ally and collectively.  Given that  quantitative
coherence  within  and  between  individuals  is
paramount,  factors  such  as  personal  opinion
are irrelevant to the truth criteria of the mode
of science. In the mode of daily practice (i.e.,
politics),  however,  opinion  and  desire  (i.e.,
how people want to live their lives) constitute
the issue at hand. Truth, therefore, could not
be measured in terms of the degree of quantit-
ative coherence within and between individu-
als. Rather, it was reflected in the degree to
which members of a group treated each other
in accordance with a normatively determined
system of expectations. As a result, the truth
criteria  of  the  modes  of  science  and politics
(i.e., daily practice) were similar in that they
were both measured in terms of coherence but
were fundamentally different  in  terms of  the
phenomena  whose  coherence  was  being  as-
sessed  (i.e.,  quantification  of  a  phenomenon
versus normatively determined expectations). 
Because  of  this  qualitative  difference  in
the relata of science and politics, Oakeshott ar-
gued that the truth criteria of one could not co-
herently be used to measure the truth of  the
other. That is, just as personal opinion and de-
sire were to play no role in the truth status of
scientific statements,  quantitative coherence in
both  individual  and  collective  descriptions
should not play a role in determining the truth
status of political statements (i.e., statements of
how people should live their lives).
Oakeshott  went  to  such great  lengths  to
distinguish science as a mode of experience be-
cause he felt he needed to provide an alternative
to the correspondence approach. By appealing to
the notions of  coherence  and  internally related
unity that were common to idealist philosophers,
without making appeals to the mental, spiritual,
transcendental, or absolute, Oakeshott presented
a coherence approach that was capable of  ad-
dressing the physicalist, naturalist forms of cor-
respondence thinking that were emerging during
his time. The difference between Oakeshott’s co-
herence approach and the correspondence-driven
naturalism of his time was not that the former
did not believe in the reality of objects or that
the former was created to maintain a place for
God in metaphysics,  as had been the case for
Berkeley and Kant. Rather,  the difference was
that the former recognized the logical incoher-
ence of the latter and worked to develop an ap-
proach to reality that avoided the logical pitfalls
historically encountered by the latter. Given that
direct realists such as Holt et al. (1910) and Gib-
son (1979), who were, to some extent, contem-
poraries  of  Oakeshott,  had probably developed
fairly  robust  associations  between  coherence,
idealism, and the religious agendas of Berkeley
and Kant, they probably had no reason to as-
sume  that  an  idealist-inspired  philosophy  had
anything to offer.
Regardless  of  who  did  or  did  not  read
Oakeshott’s work while he was alive, his lack of
appeal  to  mental,  spiritual,  transcendental,  or
absolutist  themes,  coupled  with  his  persistent
attacks on the correspondence approach, collect-
ively support the idea that when he referred to
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reality as a world of experience, he was using it
more as a placeholder in his arguments with the
correspondence  approach  as  a  way  to  slowly
transform the reader’s meaning of the word ex-
perience from the subjective-mental denotation
it had acquired in the midst of the correspond-
ence approach to the holist-driven, internally re-
lated unity of all phenomena it was meant to
imply in the coherence framework. 
d. Coherence and science.  To corres-
pondence ears, the description of the coherence
approach given above might be interpreted as
antiscientific.  That  is,  since  we take  seriously
the  logical  incoherence  of  the  correspondence
approach and assert that it does not inform us
about context-independent, intrinsic properties
of reality, one might assume we are proposing
that  science  does  not  reveal  truth.  This  is  a
common reaction of those who implicitly hold a
correspondence  view.  They assume that  those
who acknowledge the strength of Hume’s insight
are actually denying the existence of “things.”
This is  simply not the case. As stated above,
radical skepticism is a critique of the internal
logic of the correspondence approach to reality
and  truth,  not  a  critique  of  the  existence  of
“things.”  Oakeshott’s  coherence  approach con-
stitutes a means of addressing reality and truth
in a way that does not beg incoherent corres-
pondence  assumptions.  In  order  to  further
demonstrate  the  compatibility  of  science  and
the coherence approach, we present WST as a
case in point. As we present WST we will also
point out how various choice points in the the-
ory’s construction were guided by the notion of
coherence.
3 Wild systems theory
WST is a recently developed theory of cognitive
systems  (Jordan 2008,  2013;  Jordan &  Ghin
2006, 2007; Jordan & Heidenreich 2010; Jordan
&  Vinson 2012) that conceptualizes organisms
in a different light than technological metaphors
such as switchboards and computers, or dynam-
ical  metaphors  such  as  Watt  Governors  and
convection rolls. Rather, WST follows the lead
of physicists (Schrödinger 1992), theoretical bio-
logists (Kauffman 1995) and ecologists (Odum
1988),  and conceptualizes  organisms as  multi-
scale, self-sustaining energy-transformation sys-
tems. What is meant by  self-sustaining is that
the  work  of  the  system  (i.e.,  the  energy  ex-
changes  that  actually  constitute  the  system,
such as the chemical work that constitutes bio-
logical  systems)  gives  rise  to  products  (e.g.,
other chemicals) that serve as a catalyst for the
reaction  that  produces  the  product  or  some
other reaction in the system. When a self-cata-
lyzing system of work emerges, it is able to sus-
tain itself as long as the proper fuel source re-
mains available. 
What is meant by  multi-scale is  that an
organism can  be  coherently  conceptualized  as
being constituted of different scales of self-sus-
taining work.  Jordan & Vinson (2012) describe
the notion of multi-scale, self-sustaining work in
the following manner:
At the chemical level, self-sustaining work
has  been  referred  to  as  autocatalysis
(Kauffman 1995),  the  idea  being  that  a
self-sustaining  chemical  system is  one  in
which reactions produce either their  own
catalysts or catalysts for some other reac-
tion in the system. At the biological level,
self-sustaining work has been referred to as
autopoiesis  (Maturana &Varela 1980),
again, the idea being that a single cell con-
stitutes  a  multi-scale  system of  work  in
which lower-scale  chemical  processes  give
rise to the larger biological whole of  the
cell which, in turn, provides a context in
which the lower-scale work sustains itself
and the whole it gives rise to (Jordan &
Ghin 2006).  Hebb (1949) referred to the
self-sustaining  nature  of  neural  networks
as the ‘cell assembly’, the idea being that
neurons  that  fire  together  wire  together.
Jordan & Heidenreich (2010) recently cast
this idea in terms of self-sustaining work
by examining data that indicate the gener-
ation of action potentials increases nuclear
transcription processes  in neurons which,
in turn, fosters synapse formation. At the
behavioural level,  Skinner (1976) referred
to the self-sustaining nature of behaviour
as  operant  conditioning,  the  idea  being
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that  behaviours  sustain  themselves  in
one’s behavioural repertoire as a function
of the consequences they generate. Streeck
&  Jordan (2009) recently described com-
munication as a dynamical self-sustaining
system in which multi-scale events such as
postural  alignment,  gesture,  gaze,  and
speech produce outcomes that sustain an
ongoing  interaction.  And  finally,  Odum
(1988) and Vandervert (1995) used the no-
tion of self-sustaining work to refer to eco-
logies in general. (p. 235)
3.1 Wild systems theory and coherence
Conceptualizing  organisms  as  being  composed
of multi-scale, self-sustaining work is consistent
with coherentism (Lycan 2012). That is, the no-
tion of self-sustaining work increases the coher-
ence of our conceptualization of organisms (i.e.,
beliefs about organisms) because it reveals the
dynamic  homologies  that  transcend  both  the
phyla  and  the  nesting  of  multi-scale,  energy-
transformation systems that constitute a single
organism. From plants, to neurons, to behavior,
to  persons,  to  human  societies,  increasingly
complex  systems  of  work  (i.e.,  energy  trans-
formation)  have  evolved  precisely  because  the
work of which they are constituted is self-sus-
taining in that the work produces catalysts for
either  the  work  itself  or  some  other  level  of
work in the multi-scale system.
When  we  conceptualize  organisms  with
technical  metaphors such as switchboards and
computers,  we  leave  out  these  homologous,
multi-scale,  energy-transformation  dynamics
that living systems do not have in common with
technological systems. This use of technological
metaphors then forces us to generate explana-
tions of the means by which our technologically
inspired model of the organism is “connected”
to the external context. To be sure, the issue is
not  unique  to science.  Descartes  ran into the
same  problem  when  he  divided  humans  into
physical  and  spiritual  substrates,  and  most
scholars who have taken Descartes’s correspond-
ence  problem seriously  have  had to  do some-
thing  similar.  Locke  proposed  causal  connec-
tions between external events and internal im-
pressions and ideas. Kant proposed a priori con-
ceptions of space and time. Indirect realism pro-
posed  evolutionarily  derived  representations,
and direct  realism proposed evolutionarily de-
rived “relations.”
Given its focus on multi-scale, self-sustain-
ing homologies, WST is able to focus on that
which  is  common across  the  internal  and ex-
ternal contexts of an organism; namely, energy
transformation. As a result, WST’s focus on in-
ternal/external homologies renders it consistent
with  the  coherence  approach  to  reality  and
truth. Specifically, its focus on internal/external
homologies  prevents  WST  from  internal/ex-
ternal conceptualizations that lead to the con-
nection  problems  experienced  by  correspond-
ence-driven  approaches.  Within  contemporary
correspondence  frameworks  (e.g.,  indirect  and
direct realism), the external context tends to be
conceptualized  as  physical.  Historically,  the
concept physical has garnered its meaning from
its dialectic relationship with concepts such as
“mental” and “spiritual.” As a result, its usage
implicitly  intimates  a  correspondence  relation
and leaves us having to determine whether or
not  the  internal  context  is  likewise  physical,
mental,  or  something  altogether  different,  as
well  as  how it  is  that  the internal  context  is
connected to the external context. 
Within  WST,  the  internal  and  external
contexts of an organism are both conceptualized
in terms of energy transformation. Specifically,
the external context is conceptualized as a self-
organizing,  energy-transformation  hierarchy
(Odum 1988;  Vandervert 1995),  while  brains
and organisms are conceptualized as multi-scale,
self-sustaining  energy  transformation  systems
that are able to sustain themselves in the lar-
ger-scale  energy  transformation  hierarchy  be-
cause the work of  which they are constituted
produces  its  own  catalysts.  Inspired  by  this
idea,  Jordan & Ghin (2006) proposed that  the
fuel source dictates the consumer.  This means
that any system that sustains itself on a certain
fuel source (e.g., plants on sunlight, herbivores
on plants, or carnivores on herbivores) must be
constituted such that it is able to address the
constraints  involved  in  capturing  that  fuel
source. 
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Conceptualizing organisms as self-sustain-
ing embodiments of the contextual constraints
entailed  within  an energy-transformation hier-
archy renders WST consistent with a coherence
approach to reality and truth because an em-
bodiment of context is necessarily “about” that
context. By “necessarily” we mean that the sys-
tem’s  internal  dynamics  are  phylogenetically
and ontogenetically emergent from the energy-
transformation hierarchy in which it sustains it-
self; it is an embodiment of the reality (i.e., con-
text) within which it  emerged.  In short,  it  is
reality within reality. The idea that organisms
constitute embodiments of context is consistent
with  Friston’s  (2011) assertion that organisms
constitute an embodiment of an optimal model
of their environment. Interestingly enough, Fris-
ton is led to this assertion for much the same
reason WST is led to its notion of organisms as
embodied  contexts;  specifically,  because  both
begin with the idea of the organism as an en-
ergy-transformation system. As a result, 
there is no epistemic gap between an or-
ganism and its environment. Organisms do
not need to be ‘informed’ by environments
in order to be about environments because
they are  necessarily  ‘about’  the contexts
they embody. Rather, what self-sustaining
systems  need  do  is  sustain  relationships
with the contexts in which they are em-
bedded in ways that lead them to sustain-
ment. According to WST, meaning is con-
stitutive of embodied context (i.e., bodies).
As a result, living systems are necessarily
meaningful (Jordan, 2000a), not because a
body is alive or dead, because it is phys-
ical, or because it is biological. Living is
meaning because it is sustained, embodied
context. (Jordan & Vinson 2012, p. 9)
Given this lack of an epistemic gap between em-
bodiments of context and the contexts in which
they sustain themselves, WST dissolves the sub-
jective-objective  epistemic  barrier  created  by
the correspondence approach. Embodiments of
context  are  naturally  and  necessarily  “about”
their  context  and,  as  a  result,  are  inherently
meaningful. 
Our  use  of  the  word  meaningful is  not
meant to imply that the evolutionary emergence
of living systems simultaneously constituted the
emergence of  meaning into a reality that had
been,  up until  then,  meaningless.  Rather,  our
equating  the  notion  of  embodied  context with
meaningfulness is meant to demonstrate the ser-
ious  metaphysical  consequences  that  emerge
from our earlier description of reality as an in-
ternally related unity. If all phenomena are, in
the end,  contextually dependent, then part of
what constitutes them is their relation with the
rest  of  reality.  In  short,  as  was  stated  previ-
ously, self-sustaining systems are reality within
reality. It is this irreducible, inherent relational-
ity that we are conceptualizing as meaning.
Within contemporary philosophy of mind,
it might seem as though we are asserting that
embodied contexts (i.e.,  self-sustaining bodies)
instantiate phenomenal  properties.  While  this
assertion is not incorrect, our concern with such
an  interpretation  is  the  implicit,  correspond-
ence-driven assumption that phenomenal prop-
erties  are  subjective  while  other  properties  of
the system are objective. Our take on this issue
is that embodied contexts do not represent the
emergence  of  phenemonology  into  reality  as
much as they represent the emergence self-sus-
taining relationality into reality. And it is this
self-sustaining  relationality  that  phylogenetic-
ally scales up to the phenomenon we refer to via
terms  such  as  consciousness  and  phenomeno-
logy.
Defining meaning in  this  way allows for
meaning  (i.e.,  embodied  context)  to  be  con-
stitutive  of  what  organisms are.  As  a  result,
phenomena  traditionally  referred  to  via  con-
cepts  such  as  phenomenology,  consciousness,
meaning, and value, which tended to be releg-
ated to the subjective/internal side of corres-
pondence frameworks and had to be described
as being emergent from, identical with, or fun-
damentally different from “physical” properties
(Chalmers 1996), are considered phylogenetic-
ally scaled-up versions of the embodied mean-
ing inherent in all embodied contexts.  Jordan
&  Vinson (2012) describe why it is that self-
sustaining  embodiments  of  context  entail
meaning: 
Jordan, J. S. & Day, B. (2015). Wild Systems Theory as a 21st Century Coherence Framework for Cognitive Science.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 21(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570191 14 | 21
www.open-mind.net
In a single-cell organism, the internal dy-
namics (i.e., the micro scale) and the or-
ganism as a whole (the macro scale) are
coupled in such a way that changes in the
micro-scale  (e.g.,  low  energy  levels)  give
rise  to  changes  at  the  macro-scale  (e.g.,
behaviors  such  as  swimming  and  tum-
bling) that recursively influence the micro-
scale (i.e., give rise to energy intake) and,
in the end, foster the sustainment of both
levels of scale. In short, the micro-macro
coupling is self-sustaining. In the case of a
rock, the micro-macro coupling is not re-
cursively self-sustaining. The coupling gen-
erates no dynamics that serve to sustain a
particular  aspect  of  either  the  macro  or
micro  organization.  (Jordan &  Vinson
2012, pp. 11-12)
Jordan &  Ghin (2006)  refer  to  the  embodied
aboutness of a single-cell organism as proto-con-
sciousness. They do so for the following reasons:
(1) to acknowledge the meaning (i.e., embodied
context) inherent in a single-cell (i.e., a small-
scale,  self-sustaining  embodiment  of  context),
and (2) to set the groundwork for an explana-
tion of how the proto-consciousness of a single-
cell system could possibly scale up to the full-
blown self-awareness entailed in humans. As re-
gards this scaling up,  Jordan &  Vinson (2012)
say the following:
It was possible for self-sustaining systems
to scale-up from the level of single-cell or-
ganisms to the level of human beings be-
cause  their  status  as  energy-transforma-
tion systems simultaneously rendered them
a potential fuel source for any system that
embodied the constraints necessary to sus-
tain itself on such embodied energy. As an
example, the emergence of herbivores gave
rise to a context that afforded the emer-
gence  of  carnivores.  A  significant  con-
straint of being a carnivore, however, was
the need to capture a moving fuel source.
Doing so required, and still requires, anti-
cipatory  structures  regarding  the  future
location of the moving target. Jordan and
Ghin (2006) assert that the embodiment of
anticipatory dynamics in the neuromuscu-
lar  architecture  of  organisms  capable  of
propelling  themselves  as  a  whole  toward
anticipated  locations  constituted  the
phylogenetic  emergence  of  anticipatory
aboutness. That is, the self-sustaining dy-
namics of one system came to be ‘about’
the  future  dynamics  of  another  system.
WST equates such anticipatory aboutness
with the traditional notion of  mind, and
proposes  that  phenomena  that  have  re-
ceived  labels  such  as  memory,  thought,
phenomenology, and self-awareness consti-
tute  evolutionary  recursions  (i.e.,  scale-
ups) of the anticipatory dynamics embod-
ied in self-sustaining systems. Given that
all  self-sustaining  systems  constitute  em-
bodiments  of  context  and  are,  therefore,
necessarily ‘about’ context, their anticipat-
ory  dynamics  likewise  entail  ‘aboutness.’
Thus,  as  self-sustaining  systems  evolved
and  became  increasingly  abstract  (i.e.,
about increasingly abstract events such as
tomorrow, next week, and/or next year),
meaning,  too,  became  increasingly  ab-
stract. (Jordan & Vinson 2012, p. 12)
WST’s conceptualization of meaning as embod-
ied  context  is  consistent  with  Oakeshott’s
(1933) coherence approach to reality and truth
in that it does not assume that subjects and ob-
jects are independent and in need of connection.
Rather, subjects (i.e., organisms) are considered
embodiments of their context and are, therefore,
internally related to their context. The contexts
in which they are and have been embedded are
constitutive of what they are. Said in a more fa-
miliar way, a thoroughgoing (i.e., maximally co-
herent),  ontologically  minded  explanation  of
what an organism is must include all aspects of
the organism as well as the contexts it embod-
ies. 
To be sure, WST is not the only approach
to  propose  that  (1)  organisms  constitute  em-
bodiments of their contexts, and (2) such sys-
tems  necessarily  entail  anticipatory  dynamics.
As was stated previously,  Friston (2011) makes
a similar claim when he asserts that (1) organ-
isms constitute optimal models of their environ-
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ments, and (2) they utilize anticipatory coding
as  a  means  of  optimally  maintaining  homeo-
stasis. (See Andy Clark’s, Jakob Hohwy’s, and
Anil  Seth’s contributions to this collection for
other approaches to cognition that posit a reli-
ance on anticipatory coding.). A potential dif-
ference between WST and Friston’s position is
the degree of  metaphysical  commitment WST
makes to the assertion that reality constitutes
an internally related unity. That is, while Fris-
ton’s view is consistent with the notion of em-
bodied contexts, it is not clear he also agrees
with  the  coherence  approach  to  reality.  As  a
matter of his fact, much of his explanation of
how it is that organisms generate and maintain
minimum  free  energy  is  couched  in  the  epi-
stemic language of external stimuli and internal
representations. Though the use of these terms
does not,  in and of  itself,  indicate a commit-
ment to direct or indirect realism, it does re-
veal, at the very least, a minimal, implicit com-
mitment to a correspondence approach to real-
ity and truth. 
This comment on Friston’s position should
not be construed as a critique of his framework,
as much as it should be taken to constitute a
means by which the unique metaphysical com-
mitments of WST can be thrown into sharp re-
lief. Friston’s goal is to provide a maximally co-
herent account of the causality underlying cog-
nition. The goal of WST is to provide a scien-
tifically informed approach to reality and truth
that does not rely on the correspondence rela-
tion.  The  difference  in  these  missions  fairly
thoroughly accounts for the differences between
WST and Friston’s free energy approach, and
the jury can still be out as to whether or not
the  free-energy  principle  constitutes  a  corres-
pondence approach to reality and truth. 
3.2 Wild systems theory and truth
As was stated previously, a coherence approach
to reality and truth assesses the degree of truth
in experience and beliefs via the degree of co-
herence  entailed  in  and  across  both.  As  was
also previously stated, this coherence approach
to truth differs from coherentism (Lycan 2012)
in that the latter applies the criterion of coher-
ence  (i.e.,  lack  of  contradiction)  to  beliefs,
while the former applies it to both experience
(i.e.,  moment-to-moment contradictions in ex-
perience) and beliefs. 
Given  this  notion  of  the  organism as  a
self-sustaining prediction, WST is able to ap-
ply the coherence criterion to both experience
and beliefs because it conceptualizes organisms
as embodiments of context and avoids the cor-
respondence relation. As a result, truth is not
measured in terms of the degree of correspond-
ence between the subjective and the objective.
Rather, it is measured in terms of the degree of
non-contradiction  entailed  within  one’s  mo-
ment-to-moment  embodied  context  (i.e.,  phe-
nomenology) and across the beliefs one derives
from the moment-to-moment flows of embodied
context.  In  Friston’s (2011) language, the de-
gree  of  coherence  in  an  embodied  context
might be taken to refer to the degree of predic-
tion error minimization that has been achieved
by the organism’s current model of reality. To
make this work however, and to avoid the im-
plicit epistemic gap implied by the notion of a
“model  of  reality,”  the  meaning  of  the  word
model would  have  to  be  stretched  to  such  a
point  that  the  organism  itself  constitutes  a
model of reality. To be sure, Friston intimates
as much when he describes  organisms as op-
timal models  of  their  environments.  To make
this use of the word model simultaneously im-
ply that the organism-as-model  constitutes an-
ticipation, the organism itself would have to be
seen  as  constituting  a  prediction.  While  this
use of the concept prediction seems strange, it
is actually consistent with how Friston uses the
term when describing the cheomotaxic behavi-
ors exhibited by E. coli:
…by selective modulation of tumbling fre-
quency,  these  bacteria  show  chemotaxis.
This  is  a  nice  example  of  an  itinerant
policy based on the prior expectation (en-
dowed by natural  selection) that  the or-
ganism  will  only  change  its  motion
through  state-space  when  it  encounters
unexpected  (costly)  generalized  states
(here,  a decrease in the concentration of
attractants). (2011, p. 114)
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What is at issue here is the degree of ontological
commitment entailed in Friston’s assertion that
natural selection endows organisms with prior ex-
pectations. Is he claiming that organisms are con-
stituted of phylogenetically derived prior expecta-
tions, or is he simply presenting prior expecta-
tions as a productive way to model organisms?
While his assertion that organisms constitute op-
timal models of their environments seems to favor
the former interpretation, his later use of terms
such as sensations and representations seems to
favor the latter. Whatever the case, if Friston’s
notion  of  minimizing  prediction  error  is  to  be
used as a description of what it means for there
to be a contradiction in the flow of contingent
context,  then the concept  prediction has to be
used in a way that does not engender an epi-
stemic gap. In short, the organism has to be con-
ceptualized as a self-sustaining prediction.
In order to better clarify this admittedly ab-
stract means of talking about truth, we offer cer-
tain arguments presented in the present paper as
a case in point. As was mentioned previously, in-
direct- and direct-realist approaches to reality and
experience rely on evolutionary theory as a means
of connecting the subjective and the objective. In
our critique of these views, we argued that they
validated the correspondence relation by concep-
tually placing it within the assumed, larger-scale
reality of the evolved physical world. WST, how-
ever, also makes use of an assumed, larger-scale
reality,  specifically,  the  self-organizing,  energy-
transformation hierarchy (Odum 1988). The dif-
ference between the two uses of evolutionary the-
ory lies in what the two approaches are believed
to reveal about evolution. To realists, be they dir-
ect or indirect realists, evolutionary theory is be-
lieved to reveal reality as it is, independent of ob-
servers. Within WST, evolutionary theory is def-
initely seen as being “true,” but in the coherence
sense that it is the most coherent account of the
existence of species yet given. 
When describing the “truth” of evolutionary
theory in coherence terms, it is important to re-
member  that  WST  is  not  radically  skeptical
about whether or not the phenomena referred to
via the realist notion of an evolved physical world
(e.g., organisms, rocks, and plants) exist. To the
contrary, it would be incoherent to deny our belief
that such phenomena exist and do so outside of
our skin. What is at stake is the issue of  how
something exists  beyond our skin.  In a corres-
pondence  framework,  what  is  important  about
something existing on the other side of our skin is
that it be observer-independent. Given this con-
ceptualization, one has to explain how observer-
independent and observer-dependent phenomena
are connected. In the coherence framework, the
existence of objects beyond the skin, as well as
the idea that they exist as such without the pres-
ence of an observer, is conceded. However, defin-
ing their reality status in terms of their observer-
independence  is  seen  as  being  insufficient,  for
even though they may exist independently of the
presence of an  observer, such observer-independ-
ence in no way implies such objects exist inde-
pendently  of  all  context.  No  phenomenon,  no
matter how universal, exists as it does independ-
ently of all other phenomena. In short, all phe-
nomena are context-dependent. 
WST’s notion of embodied context implies
that we should measure the truth status of claims
made in cognitive science in terms of their degree
of coherence, both within experience and across
beliefs. Given that most contemporary cognitive
scientists are direct or indirect realists, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, they tend to assume the cor-
respondence relationship (again, either explicitly
or implicitly), which, in turn, makes it difficult for
them to coherently address the reality of “subject-
ive” phenomena such as phenomenology, mean-
ing, and value. To be sure, by aligning itself with
a  coherence  approach  to  truth,  WST logically
denies itself access to objective, intrinsic reality.
But given that WST conceptualizes the notion of
objective,  intrinsic  reality  as  an  incoherent  as-
sumption derived from the coherence of moment-
to-moment  experience,  WST,  simply  given  its
commitment to coherence, could not accept such
a notion in the first place.
3.3 Wild systems theory and cognitive 
science
Given that WST is not designed to reveal in-
trinsic properties of objective reality, its beliefs
about science are inconsistent with the corres-
pondence  notion  that  science  is  metaphysical.
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Let us recall that the slogan “science is meta-
physical”,  which was briefly mentioned at the
beginning  of  the present  paper,  is  just  short-
hand for the philosophical thesis that the goal
of science is to overcome the objective-subject-
ive divide and reveal the “real,” observer-inde-
pendent,  intrinsic  properties  of  reality.  By as-
serting  that  all  properties  are  contextually
grounded  and  cannot  therefore  be  intrinsic,
WST posits that science cannot reveal intrinsic
properties. As a result, there is no final, thing-
as-it-is  essence  to  which  any  “experience”  or
“theory”  can correspond.  As  a  further  result,
there can be no correspondence test of reality.
Science, therefore, cannot be metaphysical. This
lack of belief in the metaphysical nature of sci-
ence, however, is in no way anti-scientific. On
the  contrary,  it  is  wholly  consistent  with
Oakeshott’s (1933) contention that the practice
of  science  constitutes  a  mode  of  experience.
That is, if reality is an internally related unity,
then theories are constitutive of that reality and
can never “point to” reality as if to do so out-
side of it. They are, by definition, “in it” just as
we are.  Thus,  they  are,  by definition,  incom-
plete, what Oakeshott referred to as an arrest-
ment of the whole (i.e., a mode of experience).
As  an  example,  WST’s  scientifically  inspired
conceptualization of organisms as self-sustaining
embodiments of context does assume a “larger-
scale reality” within which organisms are nes-
ted, just as direct and indirect realism do. The
different reasons for doing so are important. In
WST, a larger-scale reality is assumed because
it would be incoherent not to do so. That is, we
would  be  contradicting  both  our  experiences
and our beliefs  about those experiences  if  we
claimed we did not exist within something lar-
ger  than  ourselves.  From  the  correspondence
perspective,  a  larger-scale  reality  is  assumed,
and  it  is  believed  to  comprise  observer-inde-
pendent, intrinsic properties that science will ul-
timately reveal. 
An  immediate  implication  of  coherence-
versus correspondence-driven approaches to sci-
ence is that while the latter conceptualizes sci-
ence as inherently metaphysical (i.e., it reliably
reveals  intrinsic,  observer-independent  proper-
ties of objective reality), the former conceptual-
izes science as a method by which we are able
to  increase  the  coherence  of  our  statements
about that within which we are embedded (i.e.,
coherentism;  Lycan 2012). Such coherentism is
valuable  because  it  affords  us  more  influence
over our context; that is, it affords us the abil-
ity to more effectively sustain ourselves. 
To be sure, the idea that the value of sci-
ence is pragmatic, as opposed to metaphysical,
is  not new.  Dewey (1929) proposed much the
same:
But the search does not signify a quest for
reality in contrast with experience of the
unreal  and  phenomenal.  It  signifies  a
search for those relations upon which the
occurrence of real qualities and values de-
pends, by means of which we can regulate
their occurrence. To call existences as they
are directly and qualitatively experienced
‘phenomena’  is  not  to  assign  to  them a
metaphysical status. It is to indicate that
they set the problem of  ascertaining the
relations  of  interaction  upon which  their
occurrence  depends.  (Dewey 1929,  pp.
103–104)
Interestingly enough, Dewey espoused his prag-
matic approach to science for much the same
reason  Oakeshott  proposed  his  coherence  ap-
proach  to  reality  and  truth—specifically,  be-
cause they both believed that the realist, phys-
icalist naturalism of their time was inspired by
a logically incoherent correspondence framework
that  had  been  historically  derived  from dual-
ism’s assumed split between spiritual and ma-
terial reality. Dewey states,
The notion that the findings of science are
a disclosure of the inherent properties of
the ultimate real, of existence at large, is a
survival of the older metaphysics. It is be-
cause  of  injection  of  an  irrelevant  philo-
sophy  into  interpretation  of  the  conclu-
sions of science that the latter are thought
to  eliminate  qualities  and  values  from
nature. This created the standing problem
of  modern  philosophy:—  the  relation  of
science to the things we prize and love and
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which  have  authority  in  the direction  of
conduct. (1929, p. 102)
As regards cognitive science specifically, WST’s
coherence approach to the meaning of  science
provides a way for cognitive scientists to experi-
ence  their  theories  and  models  as  pragmatic
tools  versus  metaphysical  tests.  In  addition,
WST’s reliance on the concept of embodied con-
text provides a means for cognitive scientists to
discuss  those  phenomena  traditionally  associ-
ated with the subjective side of correspondence
theorizing  (e.g.,  phenomenology,  value,  and
meaning) without relying on the subjective-ob-
jective correspondence relation. This is import-
ant, for as was mentioned in the latter half of
the preceding quote by Dewey, by conceptualiz-
ing the practice of science as a means of over-
coming the correspondence relationship, realist
philosophers  ultimately  put  the  reality  of  the
“subjective” at risk as more and more natural-
ists  came  to  conceptualize  the  subjective  in
terms of inherently meaningless, physical prop-
erties (Gardner 2007). As was stated previously,
by conceptualizing organisms as self-sustaining
embodiments of context, WST renders proper-
ties that had been historically associated with
the  subjective,  such  as  phenomenology,  value,
and meaning (see Jordan & Vinson 2012, for a
thorough review of  this  issue),  constitutive of
what organisms are. As a result, cognitive sci-
entists  can avoid distracting  arguments  about
such  correspondence-driven  issues  as  the
grounding problem (i.e.,  how do concepts and
symbols garner their meaning; Harnad 1990), or
the relationship between the physical brain and
consciousness. These issues are only experienced
as important, hard problems within the concep-
tual confines of correspondence theory and the
belief that the answer will be found via cognit-
ive science. 
4 Conclusions
To be sure, there were twentieth-century philo-
sophers other than Dewey and Oakeshott whose
approach to reality and truth was very consistent
with the coherence approach. Heidegger and Mar-
leau-Ponty are two examples. Perhaps these rela-
tionships will be fleshed out to a greater extent in
future papers. For the present paper, the purpose
was to (1) illustrate for the reader that there is
another, historically relevant, robust approach to
reality and truth other than the correspondence
approach, and (2) illustrate that this other ap-
proach is completely consistent with science.
Maybe it was the fact that many idealist
philosophers  used  their  anti-correspondence
frameworks as a means of defending the reality of
God that led so many scientifically minded philo-
sophers to avoid it to the point that now, after
more  than one  hundred  years  of  neglect,  it  is
rarely if ever mentioned or utilized in cognitive
science. This is precisely why we began this paper
with  the  snake-bracelet  story.  Coherence  ap-
proaches have been out of fashion for so long that
we felt it necessary for the reader to experience,
first hand, the type of thinking that has always
fostered questions about reality. Our assumption
was  that  by  experiencing  the  tension  between
what it means to describe the snake as real and
what it means to describe the bracelet as real, the
readers would be in a better position to under-
stand that although the coherence approach was
ignored  during  the  past  century,  Oakeshott’s
presentation of a non-spiritual, non-absolute, non-
transcendental coherence framework leaves the co-
herence and correspondence frameworks on sim-
ilar, logical ground. Given the advent of concepts
such as external grounding, ultra grounding, and
global groundness in contemporary philosophy of
science, it seems the coherence approach to reality
and truth is, at the very least, once more being
discussed. 
Wild Systems Theory is only one possible
theory of “what people are” that could emerge
from  a  coherence-driven  perspective,  and  we
suspect there will be others. But given WST’s
description of phenomenology as an evolutionar-
ily,  scaled-up form of  self-sustaining embodied
context,  phenomena  such  as  the  taste  of  ice
cream are rendered just as “real” as the cream
and sugar that constitute the ice cream. We be-
lieve  this  is  an  important  achievement.  And
when one considers  WST’s compatibility with
science, it seems reasonable to propose WST as
a twenty-first-century coherence framework for
cognitive science.
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